W e provide a new mathematical model for strategic traffic management, formulated and analyzed as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The model includes two types of control (upper-level) variables, which may be used to describe such traffic management actions as traffic signal setting, network design, and congestion pricing. The lower-level problem of the MPEC describes a traffic equilibrium model in the sense of Wardrop, in which the control variables enter as parameters in the travel costs. We consider a (small) variety of model settings, including fixed or elastic demands, the possible presence of side constraints in the traffic equilibrium system, and representations of traffic flows and management actions in both link-route and link-node space.
Introduction
The need for measures to reduce congestion in the metropolitan traffic areas is becoming more serious as citizens cluster in cities with the immediate side effect of an increase in traffic demand. A functioning society depends on the mobility provided by the transportation network to enable its members to participate in essential activities such as production, consumption, communication, and recreation. It is however necessary for society also to introduce congestion-relief measures for the quality of life, the environment, and the safety of the citizens not to deteriorate.
Any well-founded traffic model recognizes the individual network user's right to decide when, where, and how to travel. The criteria by which the user makes these choices are selfish, and are therefore on the aggregate level not entirely in par with society's goals of an efficient and safe utilization of the traffic network. A classical example of this conflict is that the typical traveller can be expected to choose a route between his/her origin and destination such that the combined travel time and cost is minimal given the network conditions when the travel is made; the aggregate effect of these decisions is a network flow that does not minimize the total system costs.
We may model this conflict in the traffic system as a noncooperative Stackelberg game, in which a traffic manager, represented as the leader, takes some action, such as a change in the infrastructure or in the traffic signal plans, so as to achieve some overall PATRIKSSON AND ROCKAFELLAR Bilevel Optimization for Traffic Management management goal with respect to the distribution of the traffic in the network and some measure of network performance. The travellers are then modelled as the followers; they react to the actions of the manager by modifying their behavior, for example, by adjusting their route choices, travel modes, or time of day to travel. If the manager's actions are adequate, then the travellers' response is the desired one. Common means for achieving such a change in the traffic flows are to invest in traffic network capacity, to introduce or adjust traffic controls such as traffic lights, to introduce tolls on some links, or to supply the travellers with information about alternative routes. The common point in all these traffic management models is that the main control variable is the users' travel costs (or, rather, travel cost adjustments), even though they may be influenced indirectly through the actions implemented.
Taking as the starting point a general Stackelberg model of the decision problem, we provide several examples of possible management goals and corresponding model instances. Measures that one can model through this strategy are variations in traffic signal plans, alterations of the network infrastructure, also referred to as network design, and the introduction and setting of tolls in the network. We begin however with a short discussion on the equilibrium model that represents the behavior of the network users given a network infrastructure. We stress already at this stage that we shall be concerned only with the case of static equilibrium conditions, thus ignoring in this work possible time-dependent (dynamic) effects.
Wardrop Equilibrium

Let
= be a transportation network, where and are the sets of nodes and directed links (arcs), respectively. For certain ordered pairs of nodes, p q ∈ , where node p is an origin, node q is a destination, and is a subset of × , there are positive travel demands d pq (which initially shall be assumed fixed) giving rise to a link traffic flow pattern. We assume that the network is strongly connected, that is, that at least one route joins each origin-destination (OD) pair. Wardrop's user equilibrium principle (1952) states that for every OD pair p q ∈ , the travel costs of the routes utilized are equal and minimal. We denote by pq the set of simple (loop-free) routes for OD pair p q , by h pqr the flow on route r ∈ pq , and byc pqr = c pqr h the travel cost on the route given the vector h ∈ of route flows, where denotes the total number of routes in the network; with this notation, an equilibrium flow is defined by the conditions h pqr > 0 ⇒c pqr = pq r ∈ pq p q ∈ (1a) h pqr = 0 ⇒c pqr ≥ pq r ∈ pq p q ∈
where the value of pq = pq h is the minimal (i.e., equilibrium) route cost in OD pair p q . By the nonnegativity of the route flows, the system (1) can more compactly be written as the complementarity system
where a ⊥ b, for two arbitrary vectors a b ∈ n , means that a T b = 0. The Wardrop conditions state that an equilibrium state is reached precisely when no traveller can decrease his/her travel cost by unilaterally shifting to another route.
To cast the Wardrop conditions as a variational inequality problem, we need to decide in which space we wish to represent the flows and the flow feasibility requirements. A general form is obtained by describing the set of feasible, aggregate, link flows as the solution in f ∈ to the linear system
where v is the (disaggregated) vector of the commodity flows, V is an incidence matrix that describes the aggregation of these flows into a corresponding link flow f , and W is an incidence matrix that describes the feasibility requirements with respect to the demand, d, in the commodity flow space.
The most common representation of the Wardrop conditions as a variational inequality problem is in terms of the route flow variables h pqr . We obtain this formulation by identifying v = h, d ∈ ++ as the vector of each OD pair's demand, and W = T , where
is the route-OD pair incidence matrix (i.e., the element rk is one if route r joins OD pair k = p q ∈ , and zero otherwise). In a disaggregated version of the Wardrop conditions, we consider only utilizing the part (3b)-(3c) of the system (3) above, thus describing the (bounded polyhedral) set
of demand-feasible route flows. The condition (1) is equivalent to h satisfying −c h ∈ N H h VIP-H wherec + → ++ is the vector of route travel cost functions, and N S s denotes the normal cone to a nonempty, closed and convex set S ⊆ n at s ∈ n , that is, the set
To see this equivalence directly, we utilize the notation to rewrite (2) as follows:
Together with the feasibility requirement that T h = d must hold, the system (4) describes the optimality conditions for h, solving the linear program to minimizec h T y over y ∈ H ; this is precisely [VIP-H] . We remark here that the existence of several groups of users or modes of transport is easily modelled within the above framework, by simply creating a copy of the network for each user group and mode, and relating their travel costs, if needed, through the vectorc.
In the case where the travel cost of a route is the sum of the travel costs on the links defining it (i.e., the route costs are additive), then the above Wardrop conditions can be described in terms of link flows. We then further identify V = in (3a), where ∈ 0 1 × is the link-route incidence matrix (i.e., the element ar equals one if route r utilizes link a, and zero otherwise), and thus the (bounded polyhedral) set of demand-feasible link flows
Then, the problem [VIP-H ] can be equivalently written as −t f ∈ N F f VIP-F wheret + → ++ is the vector of link travel cost functions. (The link and route costs are related bȳ c h = Tt f , for any pair h f ∈ H × F .) The set of feasible link flows can also be described by the OD-specific link flows that satisfy the demand for transportation and flow conservation constraints for all the nodes of the network; this is the second most popular representation of feasible flows. In the system (3), we then identify W as a blockdiagonal matrix with blocks W k , with W k = A, A ∈ −1 0 1 × being the node-link incidence matrix of the network. Further, d is a ( · )-vector, with vectors d k , each being a vector of OD-specific demands, stacked on top of each other. (The elements of d k sum to zero.) We also identify v as the ( · )-vector of commodity link flows f ak . Hence, (3b) corresponds to the commodity-specific flow conservation constraints
Finally, V is the block-diagonal ( × )-matrix that describes the aggregation of the commodity link flows f k into f . Summarizing, then, the system (3) describes the (unbounded polyhedral) set of demand-feasible link flows
In the present setting, of course, k is identified with an OD pair p q ∈ , and, further, each vector d k has precisely two nonzeros. We may, however, consider k to denote a less disaggregated flow, such as flows from different origins, or different vehicle types, etc. The two representations that we have chosen here are in that sense at the two extremes in terms of level of aggregation. We also note that in more generality, we may consider different networks, that is, different matrices A k , for each commodity k, or type k of traffic. This will necessarily also lead to a proper modification of the matrix V above. Note that F ⊂ F holds because the latter contains cyclic flows, but due to the positivity assumption ont,
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no equilibrium flow will utilize any cyclic flow, so this alternative representation is, in that sense, equivalent. In the following, we shall always consider the version [VIP-F ] whenever considering a link flow-based equilibrium system.
More general considerations, such as the possible presence of side constraints in the equilibrium system, or that the demand at equilibrium depends on the cost of the trip, is relegated to §7.
A General Stackelberg Model
The Mathematical Model
This section introduces a general Stackelberg model for the society's traffic management problem. We introduce two vectors, and , of parameters denoting the actions taken by the traffic manager.
The parameter is assumed to enter the travel cost function, leading to the parameterized (and presumed continuous) function t f (in the case of the equilibrium model [VIP-F ]), or c h (in the case of the equilibrium model [VIP-H] ). Further, is constrained to a polyhedral set, which we denote by P ⊂ p and which may be determined by political, practical, environmental, and economical constraints, and possibly other considerations as well. (The assumption that P is polyhedral is not essential to the results presented, but simplifies some parts of the algorithm.)
The parameter enters the travel cost function as an additive term. So, given actions , the travel cost mapping takes the form f → t f + (respectively, h → c h + ). We allow for no explicit constraints on because we wish for an equilibrium to always exist whatever the choice of ∈ P. However, one could always include smooth penalties for any constraints one wishes to impose on into the objective function , to be discussed next.
Among the possible actions, the manager optimizes a function, , defined over P × × (respectively, P × × ), of the actions and traffic flows. This function may include some further measures of network performance as well as measures of the cost and/or benefits associated with a given action. We shall presume throughout that this function is continuously differentiable on P × × but remark that in principle piecewise differentiability would suffice.
Taking [VIP-F ] as the underlying equilibrium model, the general problem then is to
For further reference, we shall denote the set f of solutions to (5c) by S . If the lower-level problem (5c) has unique solutions f , then the problem [MPEC-F ] is well defined, but in situations where there is more than one equilibrium solution, it is not clear how to interpret the minimization operation in [MPEC-F ] because the value of f is then impossible to predict. We next turn to explain our proposal to resolve this issue.
Sensitivity Analysis and Well Posedness
Under Lower-Level Nonuniqueness In the case where the cost mapping f → t f + is positive and strictly monotone on F , the solution, f , to (5c) is uniquely determined by , that is, S is a singleton set. We may, in the situation that this is true for every ∈ P × , think of the problem [MPEC-F ] as that to find the minimum of the function → f over P × , where f denotes the unique solution to (5c). This implicit function is continuous on P × . For the development of efficient algorithms for finding a minimum of the function → f over P × it is detrimental that it has stronger differentiability properties. Much is, of course, known about the sensitivity and stability of solutions to perturbed variational problems (see, for example, the monographs in Luo et al. 1996 , Rockafellar and Wets 1998 , Outrata et al. 1998 , and Bonnans and Shapiro 2000 , and specialized analyses have been conducted also for the case at hand. It is important to note that in traffic equilibrium models the presence of variables at different levels of aggregation (total link flows together with commodity link flows or route flows) means that some of the traditional techniques in sensitivity analysis, such as the strong regularity results by Robinson (1980) , are applicable only
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by viewing the problem in terms of the aggregated variables (total link flows). In the sensitivity analysis of traffic equilibria, this possibility has most often been overlooked, and much (unnecessary) effort has been spent on the choice of an appropriate disaggregated flow (cf. Tobin and Friesz 1988 , Qiu and Magnanti 1989 , Yen 1995 , Cho et al. 2000 . The fact that the sensitivity analysis is independent of any such choice was first demonstrated in Patriksson and Rockafellar (2002) for the case of elastic demands. Patriksson (2002) provides a rather complete analysis of the sensitivity of traffic equilibria and improves and extends the analyses made in Tobin and Friesz (1988) , Qiu and Magnanti (1989) , Yen (1995) , Outrata (1997) , Cho et al. (2000) , and Patriksson and Rockafellar (2002) , including characterizations of the differentiability, and the generation of subgradients of the mapping S at a reference point r r . An overview of the sensitivity analysis of the problem at hand follows.
Assume that the parameterization is rich enough so that the rank of the Jacobian matrix t r f r is full (that is, p). (This condition can always be fulfilled through the introduction of dummy parameters.) We introduce the sensitivity problem as that of, given a perturbation , finding a solution to the variational inequality
where
is the problem mapping, and where its feasible set is the critical cone,
where T F f r is the tangent cone to F at f r . Further, for any vector z ∈ n , z ⊥ = y ∈ n z T y = 0 is the orthogonal subspace associated with the vector z. The problem (6) amounts to solving an affine variational inequality defined such that we retain first-order optimality and feasibility in the original model. (In Qiu and Magnanti 1989 , Patriksson and Rockafellar 2002 , and Patriksson 2002 it is shown that these types of problems are special affine traffic equilibrium problems over variations of the original traffic network.) The first result states that the mapping S is strongly regular in the sense of Robinson (1980 and 1985) , that is, single-valued and locally Lipschitz continuous, at r r , if, and only if, the solution f to the sensitivity problem (6) is unique for each choice of perturbation. Moreover, when this condition is satisfied, this unique value is the directional derivative of the equilibrium link flow solution at r r in the direction of , and the mapping S is B-differentiable (in the sense of Robinson 1985) , and, equivalently, semidifferentiable (in the sense of Rockafellar and Wets 1998) . This property is important, in that it is exactly what is needed to apply a Newton-type algorithm for the problem to minimize → f over P × , a subject which has yet not found application in the context of traffic management. (See further the references Pang and Qi 1993 , Qi 1993 , and Qi and Sun 1993 , for more information about Newton methods for semi-smooth functions.) It is also enough to be able to devise bundle subgradient algorithms for the problem; see the further research section and Patriksson (2002) for further details on that subject.
A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for strong regularity is that the partial Jacobian f t r f r satisfies the condition that
that is, a positive definiteness condition on the critical subspace associated with the problem (5c) at r r f r . This type of condition has been utilized in Qiu and Magnanti (1989) , Yen (1995) , and Outrata (1997) .
The mapping S is moreover differentiable at r r if, and only if, for every choice of perturbation vector it holds that if a route r or a link for a specific commodity is such that its flow in every equilibrium solution is zero, then it remains zero in every solution to the sensitivity problem. This result in Patriksson (2002) improves on those previously stated in Tobin and Friesz (1988) , Cho et al. (2000) , which assume
that there is a strictly complementary equilibrium link flow. Not only is it shown in Patriksson (2002) that the strict complementarity condition is stronger than necessary, but that the computational formula in Tobin and Friesz (1988) , Cho et al. (2000) may fail to produce a gradient value even if one exists, or even provide a value when no gradient exists. Patriksson (2002) also supplies a calculus formula for a subgradient of S at r r in the absence of a gradient; the problem solved to obtain a subgradient is similar to that of calculating a directional derivative in each coordinate direction, but it contains only equality constraints.
In all events, the technical conditions stated above amount to some form of positive definiteness of the Jacobian of the travel cost function, which is naturally implied by some strict (or, strong) monotonicity assumption with respect to t · on F for every ∈ P. The assumption that the equilibrium solution is unique (which it will boil down to of course) is, however, often too strong to be accepted easily. We mention two such cases. If we wish to consider the underlying traffic equilibrium model [VIP-H ] in our development of traffic management instruments, we must note that the equilibrium solution h is likely to never be uniquely determined by even if f is because a link flow is not uniquely decomposable into route flows in general. (A counterexample is however the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) model of Fisk (1980) , in whose solution the route flows are unique; a necessary condition for this to hold is that the route costs are not additive. See Davis (1994) for an application of the SUE model in bilevel network design and Patriksson (2002) for a characterization of the gradient of the equilibrium link flow as an asymptotic result of SUE sensitivity analysis.) Further, if we model cost interactions between links, particularly for links joining the same intersection, it has been demonstrated (e.g., Heydecker 1983) that the appropriate travel cost mapping t will not even be monotone, whence the equilibrium link flow solution determined by the Wardrop conditions will not necessarily be unique either. (The same is true for multiclass user traffic equilibrium models; see Toint and Wynter 1996.) In our continued development, we will presume that the cost mappings t and c are continuously differentiable on their respective domains F and H, but we make no assumption about their monotonicity.
The effect of a nonuniqueness in the lower-level problem is of course that the value of becomes unpredictable (and may also in some cases imply the nonexistence of optimal solutions to the bilevel problem altogether; see, e.g., Bard and Fulk 1982) . We therefore need a finer rule for choosing one element in the set of solutions, S , to the equilibrium system (5c). (In the literature of Stackelberg games, this set is known as the rational reaction, or response, set.) There are several approaches to this problem (see, e.g., Lordin and Morgan 1992 , Dempe and Schmidt 1996 , Dempe 2000 . The two most common ones are usually referred to as the optimistic or, strong or cooperative) approach and the pessimistic (or, weak or noncooperative) approach. The optimistic approach is to assume that the followers (travellers) in the game establish (or, choose) one equilibrium that minimizes · over the set S , thereby assuming a kind of cooperation on the part of the followers. The resulting objective value for [MPEC-F ] is thenˆ = min f ∈S f whenever the minimum is attained. The pessimistic approach is precisely the opposite assumption, leading to a kind of worst-case optimal solution wherein the damage resulting from an unwelcome choice of the followers is minimized. A third alternative (Dempe 1997 ) is to introduce a perturbation of the optimistic solution to better try to reflect the behavior of the followers. Finally, a completely different way out (Dempe and Schmidt 1996, Dempe 2000) is to introduce a strictly or strongly monotone regularizing term in the lower-level cost mapping, making the lower-level solution uniquely determined, and the associated positive scaling factor is forced to zero to approach the original equilibrium problem. The Minty parameterization of the equilibrium system (5c) provided in the next section leads to a onelevel optimization problem, which we will show is equivalent to [MPEC-F ] (in the sense that they have the same set of locally optimal solutions), provided that we take the optimistic approach but not necessarily otherwise. In that section, we will also complete the discussion on the possible nonuniqueness of lowerlevel solutions with some remarks on its consequences for decentralized traffic control through link tolls. Example 1 (Network Design). A familiar form of the equilibrium network design problem (LeBlanc and Abdulaal 1979, Marcotte 1986 ) is an instance of [MPEC-F ] . Let a denote an investment in network capacity on link a; the effect of an investment is that of a reduced travel time; its form is often taken to be t a f =t a f a / a . An investment a is associated with an investment cost, a a . The goal is to minimize the total travel time, at a user equilibrium flow (that is, f = a∈ c a f f a ) while satisfying budget constraints on the investments made,
The parameters a may also be associated with the lowering of capacity of a link, such as when a lane is narrowed to allow for the construction of a bicycle lane. The lowering of capacity on certain links then acts as an influence on the travellers to choose other routes, other modes, etc. If the lower-level model (5c) is a multimodel model that allows for the demand d to differentiate between different modes of transport, then [MPEC-F ] may be used, for example, to model an influence on the travellers to utilize public transport or the bicycle alternative through inducing an additional delay for cars.
Example 2 (Signal Control). A problem of a form similar to the equilibrium network design problem is the signal setting problem. The solution of this problem aims at finding a set of signal control parameter values that, under user equilibrium conditions, optimizes some measure of the performance of the network, such as the total queueing delay, but without altering the traffic infrastructure. In this case, the variables are the signal control parameters, for example the portion of green times allocated to the signal controls, and the parameterized travel cost mapping f → t f measures the sum of travel times and delays at intersections. (See Cantarella and Sforza 1986, and Van Vuren 1993 , and references therein for examples of traffic control policies and mathematical models.) In this case, the set P is the unit simplex.
We note that the generality of the model allows for the introduction of queueing delays for private vehicles only to favour public transport.
Example 3 (Toll Optimization). The actions discussed in the above examples lead indirectly to an adjustment in the travellers' cost perception, through the increase or decrease in queueing delays, for example. It is also possible to associate the parameters with monetary expenses (although properly measured in time equivalents), such as link or route tolls. In such cases, we could let t f =t f + . Larsson and Patriksson (1998) discuss several alternative interpretations and uses of such a model, for example to induce mode changes through changes in ticket prices, and indirect derivations of so as to satisfy some flow-side constraints in equilibrium. As an example, let denote the total travel costs, and let the equilibrium problem be [VIP-F ]. The well-known marginal cost pricing solution (e.g., Dafermos and Sparrow 1971) is one optimal solution to this problem. (See Larsson and Patriksson 1998 and Bergendorff et al. 1996 , for discussions about alternative pricing solutions.) In the case where the underlying traffic model is an elastic demand model (cf. the model [EVIP-H d ] of §7.1), the optimal solution is the zero flow. We then note that toll optimization under constraints can be modelled through the framework of this paper by letting t f =t f + and by adding penalties to avoid a nonzero . 
We will utilize the Minty parameterization as follows. The condition (5c) may be viewed as the existence of a vectorf ∈ such that −t Proj F f − =f − Proj F f , in other words,
We define the mapping p × → by
(This is a mapping that induces Proj F f to become a traffic equilibrium by adjusting the value of .) Thus, we recast the problem [MPEC-F ] as the problem to
The corresponding parameterization of the normal cone operator N H leads to a problem, [P-H ], based on the equilibrium system [VIP-H ]. We remark that the vectorf does not correspond to a network flow in general, whereas its projection onto F , Proj F f , certainly does.
Properties of the Equivalent Problem
We next turn to look at the equivalence between the two problems [MPEC-F ] and [P-F ] and the basic properties of the latter. First, consider any feasible triple ¯ ¯ f in [MPEC-F ] , that is, a triple that satisfies (5c),ˆ ¯ ¯ = ¯ ¯ f , and is such that¯ ∈ P. Letf =f −t ¯ f −¯ .
From the Minty parameterization, it follows immediately thatf = Proj F f holds, and so from (11) ¯ f = ¯ ¯ f =ˆ ¯ ¯ We conclude that every feasible solution to [MPEC-F ] corresponds to a feasible solution to [P-F ] with the same objective function value. Second, consider any feasible pair ¯ f in [P-F ], that is, one with¯ ∈ P, and let the pair ¯ f be given by¯ = ¯ f andf = Proj F f . Then, again from the Minty parameterization, the triple ¯ ¯ f satisfies (5c), and sô
holds, where the inequality follows from the fact that the equilibrium flowf is not determined through any optimization over the set S ¯ ¯ . (Equality holds however if S ¯ ¯ is a singleton set.) Because, for some values of the parameters ¯ ¯ , the two models may have different objective values, the two models are not equivalent in that sense. The optimistic approach is inherent in the setup of the problem [P-F ], so embracing this approach in [MPEC-F ] becomes necessary to achieve an equivalence at locally optimal solutions. We establish below that local minimizers of do constitute local minimizers forˆ .
Proposition 4 (The Locally Optimal Solutions to [MPEC-F ] and [P-F ] Coincide). The sets of constrained, locally optimal solutions to [MPEC-F ] and [P-F ] are the same.
Proof. We establish that locally optimal solutions * f * to the problem [P-F ] translate to locally optimal solutions * * f * to [MPEC-F ]. The converse follows immediately from the correspondence between feasible solutions of [MPEC-F ] and [P-F ] established above.
Consider a locally optimal solution * f * to the problem [P-F ], and let the triple * * f * be given by * = * f * and f * = Proj F f * . Arguing by contradiction, we assume that there exists a triple ˜ ˜ f , arbitrarily close to
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Letf =f − t ˜ f −˜ (which likewise can be made arbitrarily close tof * ). Through the Minty parameterization, we then obtain that
We have therefore reached a contradiction to the local optimality of * f * in [P-F ] . This completes the proof.
This result has the interesting consequence that when we have a locally optimal solution at hand, * f * , to the problem [P-F ], a vector * * f * that locally minimizesˆ is (rather immediately) available. A final note on the nonuniqueness issue in association with the optimistic approach is the following: If we do not work under the assumption of an optimistic condition, then the optimal valueˆ * * may not be achieved when the control * * is implemented because the equilibrium solution f * actually reached by the travellers then may be such that * * f * > * * . The existence of optimal solutions to [MPEC-F ] (and, simultaneously, to [P-F ]) follows from standard existence results for nonlinear programs. We first recall an abstract result; the corollary then translates it into our problem setting. The abstract (cooperative) MPEC problem is given as follows:
We recall that a function p → ∪ is proper if x > − for every x ∈ dom , and finite for at least one x. Let lev = x ∈ p x ≤ denote the lower level set of for the level . We then say that is weakly coercive (or, level-bounded) if lev is bounded for every ∈ . (This property is equivalent to lim x → x = .) Next, let the function X denote the indicator function for X ⊆ p , that is, X x equals zero if x ∈ X, and otherwise. We then say that the function is inf-compact relative to the set X if + X is lsc, proper, and weakly coercive. The below result extends the famous Weierstrass Theorem and has been established, for example, in Zhang (1994, Proposition 2.3).
Proposition 5 (Existence of Optimal Solutions to [MPEC]). Let
denote the graph of the mapping S. Suppose that the objective function is inf-compact relative to the feasible set ∩ graph S. Then, there exist globally optimal solutions to the problem [MPEC] .
Corollary 6 (Existence of Optimal Solutions to [MPEC-F ]). Let
= P × × and
Suppose that the function P × × is weakly coercive relative to the feasible set ∩ graph S. Then, there exist globally optimal solutions to the problem [MPEC-F ] .
Proof. Because F is polyhedral and t is continuous on p × + , graph S is closed. Further, because N F f is nonempty for every f ∈ F , it is clear that for every pair f ∈ P × F , we can choose a vector such that f ∈ graph S. Because P was assumed to be polyhedral, we may conclude that the feasible set ∩ graph S is closed as well as nonempty.
The function is in C 1 on and is hence both lsc and proper on the set ∩ graph S. The property that remains to be ascertained to be able to invoke Proposition 5 is the weak coercivity of on ∩ graph S, but this follows by the assumption.
The weak coercivity assumption is rather natural. First, it is natural to assume that the controls are confined to a bounded set P. (It is in particular true for Examples 1 and 2 in §3.3.) Second, it is also reasonable that the function is such that infinitely
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large (positive or negative) tolls , or flows in infinite cycles, are discouraged in the minimization (as discussed in Example 3 in the same section). We remark that in the case of the problem [MPEC-H], the boundedness of H implies that is always weakly coercive in the flow space.
The problem [P-F ] is obviously both nonsmooth and nonconvex. Because and t are smooth and the mapping Proj F is piecewise affine (e.g., Rockafellar and Wets 1998, Proposition 12.30) , [P-F ] however is a problem of minimizing the piecewise smooth and, in particular, locally Lipschitz continuous and subdifferentially regular (Rockafellar and Wets 1998, Definition 7.25 ), hence semidifferentiable (or, B-differentiable) function over the polyhedral set , for which descent methods can be devised. We shall study such a method in the next section.
A Descent Algorithm for the
Traffic Management Model
Introduction
The algorithm to be developed starting in this section produces a stationary point for the problem [P-F ], which in this context is a feasible point * f * such that * f * f ≥ 0 ∈ T P * f ∈ where T P denotes the tangent cone mapping for the set P. Previous solution methods for traffic management models have mostly been heuristic (see, e.g., Migdalas 1995 , Ferrari 1997 , Larsson and Patriksson 1998 . In some cases (e.g., Friesz et al. 1990, Yang and Lam 1996) a heuristic type of sensitivity analysis is applied to the solution f to (5c) to find profitable search directions for the implicit objective function → f . Such a strategy-known as the implicit approach-as well as most of the other heuristics that have been proposed in the literature force one to solve for an equilibrium in each iteration, which is numerically challenging. It further presumes that the equilibrium link flow solution is uniquely determined, that is, that the link cost function t · is (at least) strictly monotone.
Other complications that may arise, and which in some cases have been ignored in the construction of descent algorithms based on the calculation of "gradients," stem from the fact that the equilibrium commodity flow (that is, commodity link flow or route flow) is not unique (cf. the discussion in §3.2) but, more importantly, does not necessarily satisfy the conditions for differentiability, especially not those based on satisfying the Wardrop conditions (1) with strict complementarity (that is, with ">" in (1b)); the calculus rules for the "directional derivatives" or "gradients" most often used include a procedure for the selection of a proper representative commodity flow in trying to achieve this. See Tobin and Friesz (1988) , Qiu and Magnanti (1989) , Outrata (1997) and Cho et al. (2000) for some such attempts, all of which require a positive definiteness property of the Jacobian of t · at the equilibrium. In contrast, our scheme for calculating descent directions for relies not on the solution of traffic equilibrium problems but rather on the (simpler) solution of strictly convex quadratic network flow problems (in fact, projections onto either flow polyhedra or subsets of their circulation flow subspaces), and no monotonicity requirements are made on the travel cost function.
We note that the reformulation of a variational inequality problem into a system of nonsmooth equations through the application of the projection operation has been utilized in sensitivity analyses of parametric nonlinear programs, in variational inequality problems (e.g., Robinson 1992 , Luo et al. 1996 , Pang and Ralph 1996 and references therein), and in algorithms for the solution of variational inequality problems (e.g., Ferris and Ralph 1995) , but as far as we are aware the Minty parameterization has not previously been used directly to devise an algorithm for an MPEC problem.
In the next subsection, we investigate how to compute the directional derivative of for the case where the underlying equilibrium problem is [VIP-F ] or [VIP-H ] . The main effort is to solve a strictly convex quadratic flow circulation problem over a subnetwork. Then, we consider the generation of a descent direction for based, essentially, in the minimization of a quadratic regularization of this derivative PATRIKSSON AND ROCKAFELLAR Bilevel Optimization for Traffic Management over all feasible directions and discuss how its computation can be performed. The main complication here is that the directional derivative is only piecewise linear as a function of the search direction, and the search direction problem is in fact a linear complementarity (LCP) constrained strictly convex quadratic optimization problem. (In the case that an iteration point is differentiable, however, it reduces to a system of equations.) In the following section, we formalize the algorithm and establish its convergence to a stationary point of [P-F ] and [P-H] under some additional, technical assumptions. The algorithm and its convergence conditions are adapted from Pang et al. (1991) (see also Luo et al. 1996 , § §4.2 and 6.3). (Of course, other approaches are also possible to apply; we refer to the MPEC text books Luo et al. 1996 , Bard 1998 , and Outrata et al. 1998 for examples and references to other algorithms and to the last section for a brief discussion on one such example.) All along, we discuss simultaneously how to perform computations and how to meet the technical conditions in practice, thus leading to a realization of the algorithm. 
Computation of
This set is a subset of the flow circulation subspace for the multicommodity network, wherein some arcs are restricted in sign or direction for certain commodities. (Formulas for computing the cones T F f and N F f are discussed in detail in Patriksson 2002 and Rockafellar 2002 and will be used henceforth.) According to Rockafellar and Wets (1998, Corollary 13 .43), we have
The directional derivative of at f in the direction of f is then
where is given by the formula (10), and where
We note that the calculation of f f separates into simple calculations for each component of and that it is linear in this vector. The calculation of Proj F f is analyzed next.
Clearly, Proj F f constitutes a strictly convex quadratic programming problem over a subset of the circulation subspace of the flow polytope. In detail, then, the following problem provides Proj F f :
where, for each p q ∈ , (or, ĥ ), we will not discuss their numerical computation by network optimization techniques, but refer to Qiu and Magnanti (1989) , Patriksson (2002) , and Patriksson and Rockafellar (2002) for numerical examples of related sensitivity problems. We finally remark that Proj F (Proj H ) is piecewise linear in f ( ĥ ) (see also Rockafellar and Wets 1998, Proposition 12.30) . 
where B is a symmetric and positive definite matrix in
. (Here, (19b) could be replaced with ∈ T P .) As we shall see, the problem (19) can be interpreted as an LCP constrained quadratic optimization problem corresponding to the minimization of a quadratically regularized linear approximation of the original problem [P-F ] .
As has already been established, the computation of f f separates into independent problems for and f and is furthermore linear and piecewise linear, respectively, in the respective arguments. From the standpoint of computational efficiency, this suggests choosing the matrix B such that it is block-diagonal. On the other hand, the quality of the search direction suggests choosing the matrix so that a quasi-Newton-type method is produced, which would require it to contain second-order information about the function about the point f .
Until this conflict has been resolved by performing numerical tests, we henceforth assume that B is block-diagonal, as discussed above. The problem (19) then separates into one problem for that is strictly convex, quadratic, and linearly constrained and whose solution is straightforward in comparison with that of the part in f , and shall not be discussed further. The other separate problem is of the form f . To analyze this problem further, we study the characterization of the projection in (17), that is, the system 
where pq and v are the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (17b) and (17c), respectively. Replacing the vector Proj F f with the (unique) vector z, which solves this system, we obtain from (20) the LCP constrained quadratic program to 
subject to 24 (25b)
As (22), this is a nonconvex problem, but it is still possible to solve it efficiently given the realization of the algorithm. The reason why this problem is difficult lies in the presence of the complementarity constraints (24c). The number of such constraints is equal to the number of routes in the OD pair p q for which the flow in h pq is degenerate, that is, belong to the set 0 pq . (This also tells us that when the projected flow is differentiable, that is, when the variables associated with the set 0 pq can essentially be removed, then the descent direction is found through the solution of a system of nonlinear equations. The same is the case with the sets 0 pq for the problem [P-F ].) First, we note that in the course of the algorithm, not all the routes in pq will be known. We will be using a technique that has proved successful when solving traffic equilibrium problems (see, e.g., Larsson and Patriksson 1992, Patriksson 1994) , wherein profitable routes in pq (that is, those for which h * pqr > 0 can be expected to hold) are generated algorithmically, through the solution of shortest route problems given temporarily fixed link costs. By also occasionally dropping previously generated routes that have received a zero flow during several consecutive iterations, the number of known routes that will give rise to the complementarity conditions (24c) will therefore be expected to be very low. Nevertheless, when such routes are present, we propose to deal with the situation when solving the problem (25) through a complete enumeration of the cases where the values of the corresponding variables z pqr are zero or not. (The approach of enumerating the complementarity conditions in the LCP system was proposed in Pang et al. 1991.) Each of these restrictions of the problem (25) is a strictly convex, linearly constrained quadratic program. 
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The step length is
(Termination criterion and iteration):
If f is acceptable → Stop.
Otherwise, go to
Step 1 with = + 1.
We remark that the Armijo line search is only one among a large variety of step length rules that may be employed in the scheme of Table 1 . For example, the algorithm of Pang et al. (1991) employs a nonmonotone line search, first analyzed in Grippo et al. (1991) , whose mechanism allows for unit steps to often be taken to speed up convergence.
Convergence Conditions
When establishing the convergence of the algorithm, we must first introduce of all an assumption on the choice of the matrices B such that they are bounded and uniformly positive definite:
The property of weak coercivity of , which was introduced in Corollary 6, ensures that the sequence f is bounded. However, we note that the often-used condition for 0 f 0 ∈ P × , the set f ∈ P × f ≤ 0 f 0 is bounded,
is implied by weak coercivity and is enough to guarantee both the existence of a globally optimal solution to the problem [P-F ] and the boundedness of the sequence f .
Finally, when using the analysis of Pang et al. (1991) we need to assume that the function is differentiable at the limit point. This is a restrictive assumption in general, and we will now explain how we try to enforce it through our realization of the algorithm.
6.3.1. The Case of [P-F ]. We first observe that a nondifferentiability of at a limit point f would be caused by a nondifferentiability of the projection operation Proj F atf . Although Proj F is, as remarked before, piecewise linear, it may have kinks where the active constraints change. The condition that is differentiable at f is equivalent to the condition that the variables f apq associated with the set 0 would be zero in the characterization (21) for any choice of perturbations in , and therefore also zero in the solution to the direction-finding problem (22). This condition is satisfied in particular if f is strictly complementary with respect to the cost f −f
Although it is a restrictive assumption, given f , the condition (32) can be checked, by solving an entropy maximization problem over the vectors f pq ; cf. Akamatsu (1997) , Patriksson (2002) .
The Case of [P-H ].
In the case of the problem [P-H], differentiability of at a limit point ĥ is equivalent to the condition that the variables associated with the set 0 pq essentially can be removed because the corresponding values h pqr in the sensitivity problem (24) would be zero for any choice of , and therefore also in the optimal solution to (25). This condition is satisfied in particular if h is strictly complementary with respect to the cost h −ĥ
In this case, then, the concern is which routes r in the sets pq , p q ∈ , will have a positive flow at h = Proj H ĥ , and whether we will be able to identify them finitely. We propose to deal with the situation as follows. As remarked before, not all routes will ever be known. Instead, we will solve the shortest route problems at regular intervals with link costs based on the current variable values and include the shortest routes in the set of variables. This way, only subsets pq ⊂ pq of the routes will be known at any given iteration . In the course of the algorithm, some of these routes will also receive a zero flow. Such routes will be identified and removed from the corresponding sets pq . (There is neither a guarantee that a generated route will always retain a positive flow, nor that a discarded route will not be regenerated.) If we keep only routes in the subsets pq having positive flow, then we will actually be visiting differentiable points of the corresponding restrictions of the problem [P-F ] to the subsets pq . For these restrictions, our algorithm will act as a scaled gradient projection algorithm. Interestingly, it is known that the active constraints at the limit point of a projection algorithm used to minimize a differentiable function over a polyhedral set will be identified after a finite number of iterations (e.g., the surveys in Patriksson (1998) and Bertsekas (1999) ). The following assumption that we make is therefore not so far-fetched: We assume that the route generation and deletion process is such that after a finite number of iterations, the subsets pq stay constant and no route in these subsets has a zero flow at h . (This way, we are guaranteed to obtain a stationary point to the restriction of the original problem [P-H ] to the sets of routes that are retained in the limit.) In other words, ∃¯ pq = pq ⊂ pq ≥¯ and h pqr > 0 r ∈ pq p q ∈
